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SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 On February 29, 2012, law enforcement officers 
executed sealed search warrants at the home and office of 
defendant Chaka Fattah, Jr. The search occurred more 
than two years before Fattah was indicted, but members 
of the press had somehow learned about the 
investigation; several reporters waited at Fattah’s home 
to report the story. How did they find out? At Fattah’s 
trial, an FBI agent admitted that he had, over the course 
of several months, disclosed confidential information to a 
reporter in exchange for information pertinent to the 
investigation. 
 Fattah argues that the FBI agent’s conduct violated 
the Sixth Amendment because the pre-indictment press 
caused him to lose his job, which in turn rendered him 
unable to retain the counsel of his choice. Fattah also 
argues that the agent’s conduct violated his Fifth 
Amendment right to due process. We conclude that 
neither argument prevails. As the Government concedes, 
the agent’s conduct was wrongful. We are unable, 
however, to conclude that Fattah is entitled to relief. 
 Fattah also raises a number of additional claims 
regarding the sufficiency of the indictment, constructive 
amendment of the indictment, improper joinder of 
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counts, and the particularity of the search warrants. We 
reject those arguments as well. Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I 
 On July 29, 2014, more than two years after the 
searches and media coverage described above, a grand 
jury returned an indictment charging defendant Chaka 
Fattah, Jr. with twenty-three counts: one count of bank 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; eight counts of 
making false statements to obtain loans, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1014; one count of making false statements 
to settle a loan, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014; three 
counts of making false statements concerning loans 
insured by the Small Business Administration, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; four counts of filing false 
federal income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7206; one count of failing to pay federal income tax, in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203; one count of theft from a 
program receiving federal funds, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A); four counts of wire fraud, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and aiding and abetting, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. A grand jury returned a 
Superseding Indictment with minor amendments on 
March 3, 2015. 
 The charges fall into three basic categories. 
 The first set of charges relate to Fattah’s 
fraudulently obtaining and failing to repay lines of credit. 
In applying for lines of credit, Fattah represented to 
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various banks that his company, 259 Strategies, LLC, 
would use the money for business purposes when in fact 
Fattah intended to use the money for personal expenses 
like gambling debts, clothing, jewelry, a BMW, and 
liquor. Fattah also failed to disclose his outstanding debts 
and misrepresented facts about his company’s 
operational status and financials. Fattah recruited his 
roommate, Matthew Amato, to make similar 
misrepresentations to obtain additional lines of credit. 
The Superseding Indictment also charges Fattah with 
making false statements to avoid repaying some of the 
banks. 
 Second, the Superseding Indictment charged 
Fattah with tax evasion. Specifically, Fattah failed to 
report certain income from his other businesses, 
including income from his sham concierge service, 
American Royalty. For example, Fattah accepted $10,000 
from an eighteen-year-old after promising that American 
Royalty would obtain an American Express black card 
for the teenager. Fattah never did so; instead, he kept the 
money and failed to report it as income. 
 And third, the Superseding Indictment charged 
Fattah with defrauding the Philadelphia School District 
(“PSD”). Fattah’s company, 259 Strategies, contracted 
with Delaware Valley High School (“DVHS”), a for-
profit educational provider. Fattah thereafter became 
DVHS’s Chief Operating Officer. DVHS, in turn, signed 
a $2.1 million contract with the PSD to run the 
“Southwest” school for troubled students. Through his 
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position at DVHS, Fattah submitted fraudulent budgets to 
the PSD that requested funding for nonexistent jobs and 
unperformed services. All told, the PSD overpaid 
$940,000 over a two-year period, and Fattah personally 
pocketed part of that sum. 
 Fattah declined representation from the Federal 
Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and has proceeded throughout this 
litigation pro se. Before trial began, Fattah filed a motion 
to dismiss the indictment. Among other accusations, 
Fattah alleged that the Government had leaked 
confidential information about the investigation to the 
press. Fattah argued, inter alia, that the Government’s 
conduct violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. 
The District Court denied the motion, concluding that 
there was no evidence of a leak. 
 Trial commenced on October 15, 2015. On 
October 27, the FBI agent in charge of the investigation 
testified that he did in fact leak confidential information 
to a reporter in exchange for background information 
about the PSD. The agent explained that he had revealed 
the existence of sealed search warrants, provided the time 
and location of the search, discussed the content of 
undercover recordings, and gave specific information 
about Fattah’s business dealings, including the amount of 
money he had been paid through his work. 
 After the agent’s testimony, Fattah (through 
standby counsel) moved for a hearing to determine 
whether the Government violated grand jury secrecy or 
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its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). The District Court denied the motion.2 
 On November 5, 2015, a jury found Fattah guilty 
on all counts except one (Count 17, filing a false income 
tax return for the year 2009). On February 2, 2016, the 
District Court sentenced Fattah to serve sixty months’ 
imprisonment and five years’ supervised release, and to 
pay $1,172,157 in restitution plus a special assessment 
fee of $2,125. Fattah timely appealed. By Order dated 
January 23, 2017, the Court appointed Ellen C. Brotman 
as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Fattah. 
II3 
 We begin with Fattah’s claims that the FBI agent’s 
conduct violated Fattah’s Sixth Amendment right to the 
counsel of his choice and violated his Fifth Amendment 
right to due process. We reject both arguments. 
A 
 Before reaching the merits of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment issues, we must first address the issue of 
                                           
 2 Fattah does not challenge that denial on appeal. 
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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waiver.4 We will not enforce waiver against either party. 
 “[I]t is well settled that arguments asserted for the 
first time on appeal are deemed to be waived and 
consequently are not susceptible to review in this Court 
absent exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Rose, 
538 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States 
v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2005)). When 
reviewing a district court’s ruling on a pretrial motion, 
including a motion alleging “a defect in instituting the 
prosecution,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A), we will not 
consider any unpreserved arguments absent “good 
cause,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3); see United States v. 
Joseph, 730 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2013); Rose, 538 F.3d at 
182. This rule applies to criminal defendants and to the 
Government alike. See, e.g., United States v. Tracey, 597 
F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Government waived 
                                           
 4 In criminal procedure, the term “waiver” 
ordinarily refers to the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right, as distinct from “forfeiture.” See United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). However, an 
earlier version of Rule 12 provided that a party “waives” 
a defense by simply failing to timely raise it. The 
reference to waiver was deleted in the 2014 Amendments 
to “avoid possible confusion.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 
advisory committee’s note. To the extent that we repeat 
that terminology here, we use it in the sense embodied in 
the earlier version of Rule 12 and our case law—to refer 
to a party’s failure to raise an argument—not in the sense 
of intentional relinquishment. 
Case: 16-1265     Document: 003112640971     Page: 8      Date Filed: 06/02/2017
 9 
 
this argument by failing to raise it before the District 
Court.”). 
 This case reaches us in an unusual posture. Fattah 
properly raised both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
claims in a pretrial motion. But at that time, the 
Government did not know about the leaks. It defended 
against Fattah’s pretrial motion by arguing that the 
presence of reporters was insufficient evidence to justify 
an evidentiary hearing. The District Court agreed. But at 
trial, the agent’s testimony confirmed Fattah’s suspicion. 
With the assistance of standby counsel, Fattah filed a 
new motion for a hearing. But the new motion did not 
reraise the Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues. As a 
result, neither the Government nor the District Court 
substantively addressed those arguments. 
 Although the Government does not explicitly 
argue waiver, it still complains that Fattah relies on 
“arguments that were not presented to the district court at 
the appropriate time and were never addressed by the 
district court.” Resp. to Amicus Br. 15. We nevertheless 
decline to enforce waiver against Fattah because 
“requiring a defendant to re-raise the issue[s] . . . would 
be an exercise in wasteful formality.” United States v. 
Sanders, 485 F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 2007). And given 
the late-breaking revelation of the agent’s conduct, 
combined with Fattah’s failure to reraise the arguments, 
we conclude that any waiver by the Government is 
excusable for good cause. 
 We proceed, then, to the merits. 




 Fattah’s Sixth Amendment claim is premised on a 
novel theory and a long causal chain. The theory is that, 
even where the government’s misconduct was 
undisputedly not directed towards attorneys’ fees or 
intended to interfere with the defendant’s right to 
counsel, a defendant may establish a Sixth Amendment 
violation by proving that the misconduct reduced his pre-
indictment income and thereby impaired his ability post-
indictment to hire the counsel of his choice. As for the 
causal chain, Fattah asserts that the FBI agent spoke to a 
reporter, which caused the publication of news stories 
about Fattah, which in turn caused DVHS to terminate 
Fattah’s employment. According to Fattah, the unrealized 
income from that employment—allegedly $432,000 (plus 
bonus)—was necessary for him to afford counsel of his 
choice. Even if we were to accept Fattah’s far-reaching 
theory, we decline to remand for an evidentiary hearing 
because Fattah’s claim to unrealized income is 
contradicted by his own undisputed statements and 
actions. 
1 
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The 
Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the right to 
effective assistance of counsel, see, e.g., Buck v. Davis, 
137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017), but also the “fair opportunity 
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to secure counsel of [one’s] own choice,” Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). “The right to select 
counsel of one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the root 
meaning of the constitutional guarantee.” United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 (2006). The Sixth 
Amendment protects the “fundamental” right “to be 
represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that 
defendant can afford to hire.” Luis v. United States, 136 
S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (plurality opinion) (citation 
omitted). 
 To argue that the deprivation of income constitutes 
a Sixth Amendment violation, Fattah principally relies on 
United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). In 
Stein, the accounting firm KPMG and several of its 
employees were under federal investigation for allegedly 
creating tax shelters for their clients. At the time, the 
Department of Justice had a stated policy of considering 
whether a corporation “appears to be protecting its 
culpable employees” when deciding whether to bring 
criminal charges against the corporation. Id. at 136. In a 
meeting with KPMG’s counsel, the prosecutors stated 
that they would take this policy “into account” regarding 
KPMG’s decision to pay its employees’ legal fees. Id. at 
137. The prosecutors’ statements pressured KPMG into 
withdrawing financial support for employees who were 
indicted. Id. at 139–40. 
 The district court in Stein found that the 
Government pressured KPMG into modifying its policy 
in order to “minimize the involvement of defense 
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attorneys,” and, but for that conduct, “KPMG would have 
paid defendants’ legal fees and expenses without 
consideration of cost.” Id. at 141 (citation omitted). The 
district court ruled that the Government violated the 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights, and the Second 
Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit held that “the Sixth 
Amendment protects against unjustified governmental 
interference with the right to defend oneself using 
whatever assets one has or might reasonably and lawfully 
obtain.” Id. at 156. The Second Circuit also held that the 
Government’s pre-indictment conduct had “post-
indictment effects,” and therefore implicated the Sixth 
Amendment even though the right to counsel attaches 
upon indictment. Id. at 153. 
 Stein tested the outer limits of the Sixth 
Amendment’s protection. Fattah would have us extend 
those boundaries even further. Unlike Stein, the 
Government here undisputedly lacked any “desire” or 
“purpose” to “deliberately interfere” with counsel. Id. at 
141, 153, 155. Any alleged loss of income would have 
been an unintended and incidental consequence of the 
agent’s conduct. Also unlike Stein, DVHS decided to 
terminate Fattah’s employment5 independent of any 
influence from prosecutors. There was no “close nexus” 
between DVHS and the Government with regard to the 
                                           
 5 The Government states that it is in possession of 
evidence that Fattah was never fired from DVHS, but 
instead decided not to return to work. We will, however, 
consider only evidence of record. 
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termination. See id. at 146–51. But we need not resolve 
the case on that basis. Based on the unique facts of this 
case, Fattah’s claim fails for a more fundamental reason. 
Fattah’s claim depends on the factual assertion that the 
Government deprived him of income that he otherwise 
would have “reasonably and lawfully obtain[ed],” id. at 
156, but Fattah has failed to make an adequate 
preliminary showing to support that assertion. As such, 
he would not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 
Sixth Amendment claim even if his broad-sweeping legal 
theory were cognizable.6 
                                           
 6 On May 17, 2017, a district court denied the 
Government’s motion for summary judgment in a 
parallel civil matter, Fattah v. United States, No. 14-cv-
1092, 2017 WL 2152171 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2017). The 
court held that “conflicting versions of why and how 
Fattah’s business relationship with [DVHS] ended 
preclude summary judgment” because “[r]esolution of 
the conflict turns on a credibility determination to be 
made by the fact finder.” Id. at *9. Our decision in this 
case is unrelated to that holding. Our conclusion is based 
on the minimal preliminary showing advanced in this 
criminal action, combined with gaps in Fattah’s proffer 
specific to the Sixth Amendment context. Even if Fattah 
ultimately succeeds in his civil action, that would not 
mend the many inadequacies in his Sixth Amendment 
claim as presented to the District Court in this case. We 
describe those inadequacies in greater detail below. 




 Because of the procedural posture of this case, the 
District Court did not consider whether to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on Fattah’s Sixth Amendment claim 
after the FBI agent testified. We conclude that, even if 
the issue had been reraised and considered by the District 
Court, Fattah would not have been entitled to a hearing. 
 To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the 
defendant’s moving papers must be “sufficiently specific, 
non-conjectural, and detailed to enable the court to 
conclude that (1) the defendant has presented a colorable 
constitutional claim, and (2) there are disputed issues of 
material fact that will affect the outcome of the motion.” 
United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2010); 
see also United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d 
Cir. 1996). 
 To support his request for an evidentiary hearing, 
Fattah relies on an affidavit he filed in the District Court 
that attests to the truth of the representations presented in 
his pretrial Motion to Quash and Reply Brief. Those 
filings, in turn, assert that the Government “caused him 
to be without funds he would have earned which 
undoubtedly affect[ed] his choice of counsel and ability 
to mount a defense.” DDE 34, at 98. Fattah claims that he 
“reasonably expected to continually receiv[e] his contract 
payments” in the amount of “more than $432,000 
($144,000 per year), plus a bonus of $117,000, prior to 
trial.” Fattah Br. 15. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 But as the Government argues, Fattah was 
preparing to leave DVHS on his own accord. The record 
discloses that Fattah sent an email to the school system 
mere days before the searches. The email asked whether 
a whistleblower would be entitled to a reward for 
revealing fraud. Meanwhile, Fattah had prepared a 
business plan to begin his own competing school, called 
Dreamchasers. Based on these facts, the Government 
argues that Fattah planned to reveal DVHS’s fraud to 
eliminate a competitor and void a noncompete clause in 
his employment contract. In Fattah’s own words, “when 
this all comes out I’m basically effectively resigned. I’m 
done. I was going to be on my way out the door anyway. 
I wanted to start my own thing and go after some 
opportunities.” Supp. App. 89. 
 Fattah does not dispute that he prepared a business 
plan and sent the email. Nor does he deny making the 
foregoing statement. Thus, by his own account, Fattah 
was “going to be on [his] way out,” id., of the very job 
which he now claims he would have remained in for 
more than two years. Moreover, by sending the email, 
Fattah took a concrete step to undermine DVHS and his 
prospects of continued employment at the company. 
Accordingly, the undisputed record contradicts Fattah’s 
claimed expectation of “continually receiving his 
contract payments” from DVHS. Fattah Br. 15. 
 Fattah attempts to resolve this contradiction by 
arguing that there is a material dispute of fact as to when 
he would have left DVHS. “My plan was to raise money 
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[for Dreamchasers], and if I didn’t raise that money I 
would have stayed at Delaware Valley High School.” 
Oral Arg. 9:29; see also Reply Br. 5–6. But according to 
that argument, Fattah’s continued employment would be 
contingent on whether a hypothetical investor would 
have taken an interest in a hypothetical business. For 
Fattah’s claim of $432,000 (plus bonus) in lost income to 
succeed, the District Court would have been required to 
speculate that no investor would have taken an interest in 
Dreamchasers over more than two years. Alternatively, 
the District Court would have been required to speculate 
that, if Fattah had succeeded in raising capital for 
Dreamchasers, the FBI agent’s conduct thwarted what 
would have otherwise been a comparably successful 
business. 
 Fattah has not claimed to be in possession of any 
evidence that would enable the District Court to 
determine what contracts, if any, Fattah’s nonexistent 
business might have won, or what income, if any, Fattah 
might have otherwise earned. Because there is no dispute 
that Fattah was going to leave DVHS, and the question of 
timing is speculative, Fattah has failed to show the 
existence of a material dispute of fact capable of 
resolution at an evidentiary hearing. Fattah’s 
counterfactual ability to afford counsel is purely 
conjectural. 
 Fattah’s claim is speculative for an additional 
reason. The Government executed a search warrant not 
only at Fattah’s apartment, but also at his office located 
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in DVHS’s headquarters. DVHS, therefore, did not learn 
about the investigation from the news media. The case 
agent testified that he thought David Shulick, DVHS’s 
CEO, possessed a copy of the warrant, or at least 
“discussed receiving copies of the search warrant from 
whomever it was served at -- on DVHS.” Supp. App. 
370; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1)(B)–(C). Fattah did not 
proffer any testimony or other evidence to suggest that 
DVHS’s decision to cut ties with Fattah was motivated 
by the news reports rather than by DVHS’s independent 
knowledge of the investigation. 
 Finally, the money at issue in Stein would have 
directly funded the defendants’ litigation expenses. Here, 
Fattah claims that he was deprived of general, fungible 
income. Thus, whether the Government in fact 
“imped[ed] the supply of defense resources,” Stein, 541 
F.3d at 156, turns on both Fattah’s income and his 
expenses. The evidence adduced at trial revealed that, 
despite his substantial income through DVHS, Fattah had 
financial difficulties. He incurred lavish personal 
expenses, owed exorbitant gambling debts, and owed 
thousands of dollars in unpaid taxes. He used lines of 
credit to cover his personal expenses and would take out 
one line of credit to cover the last. Thus for Fattah to 
have been able to afford the expensive counsel to which 
he claims to be entitled, the District Court on remand 
would be required to speculate that Fattah would have 
either made alterations to his lifestyle or would have been 
able to continually circulate lines of credit. Fattah has 
made no preliminary showing in support of any such 
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finding. Certainly if Fattah had continued his practice of 
lying in order to obtain new lines of credit, access to 
those funds would not have been protected by the Sixth 
Amendment. See Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1088 (holding that 
the Sixth Amendment protects against “the pretrial 
restraint of legitimate, untainted assets”). 
 We are far from the facts of Stein, where the 
Government directly interfered with an employer’s 
unconditional payment of legal expenses. Even if we 
were prepared to entertain the notion that incidentally 
reducing a defendant’s pre-indictment income might 
violate the Sixth Amendment—itself a dubious 
proposition—the attenuated causal chain alleged in this 
case must be supported by a “sufficiently specific, non-
conjectural, and detailed” preliminary showing of a 
material dispute of fact. Hines, 628 F.3d at 105. Far from 
meeting that standard, Fattah’s undisputed statements and 
actions directly contradict the facts proffered in support 
of his Sixth Amendment claim. His efforts to resolve the 
contradiction rely entirely on “[]conjectur[e].” Id. 
Accordingly, we decline to remand for an evidentiary 
hearing or otherwise grant relief on Fattah’s Sixth 
Amendment claim. 
C 
 Second, Fattah argues that the FBI agent’s conduct 
violated his right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth 
Amendment. Although the agent’s conduct was 
unquestionably wrongful, it does not meet the high bar of 
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outrageous misconduct that would entitle Fattah to relief 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
1 
 The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States provides that “No person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the “touchstone of due process” is 
protection against arbitrary government action. Cty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (citation 
omitted). Government action is “arbitrary in the 
constitutional sense” when it is “so egregious, so 
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the 
contemporary conscience.” Id. at 846, 847 n.8 (citation 
omitted). “While the measure of what is conscience 
shocking is no calibrated yard stick, it does, as Judge 
Friendly put it, ‘poin[t] the way.’” Id. at 848 (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted).  
 The conduct of a law-enforcement officer may 
violate the Fifth Amendment if it is “so outrageous that 
due process principles would absolutely bar the 
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a 
conviction.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–
32 (1973). For example, in Rochin v. California the 
Supreme Court held that an officer violated the Fifth 
Amendment when, in order to preserve evidence that the 
suspect had swallowed, he ordered a doctor to pump the 
suspect’s stomach—a practice the Supreme Court 
considered “brutal” and “offensive.” 342 U.S. 165, 174 
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(1952). But “the judiciary is extremely hesitant to find 
law enforcement conduct so offensive that it violates the 
Due Process Clause.” Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1065. “We must 
necessarily exercise scrupulous restraint before we 
denounce law enforcement conduct as constitutionally 
unacceptable; the ramifications are wider and more 
permanent than when only a statutory defense is 
implicated.” United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 
(3d Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
 This Court has considered, but rejected, Fifth 
Amendment challenges to law enforcement conduct in a 
variety of contexts, such as where the Government 
allegedly used an undercover agent’s sexual relationship 
with a suspect to obtain inculpatory information, see 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 232 (3d 
Cir. 1998), and where the Government allegedly 
interfered with the defendant’s attorney-client privilege, 
see United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 156 (3d 
Cir. 2008); Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1066. Claims of outrageous 
government misconduct are commonly asserted where an 
undercover officer allegedly aided or participated in the 
criminal activity charged against the defendant. See, e.g., 
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality 
opinion); Russell, 411 U.S. 423. 
 This Court has granted relief on a claim of 
outrageous government misconduct only once. In United 
States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), this Court 
held that the Government violated the Due Process 
Clause when an agent was “completely in charge and 
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furnished all of the [relevant] expertise” to create a 
methamphetamine laboratory. Id. at 380–81. In short, the 
Government “created the crime for the sole purpose of 
obtaining a conviction.” United States v. Dennis, 826 
F.3d 683, 695 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Since 
Twigg was decided, this Court has repeatedly 
distinguished,7 and even questioned, its holding. See, 
e.g., United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 12 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
2 
 This is not a case like Twigg, where the 
Government’s conduct was intertwined with the 
defendant’s. Instead, Fattah and amicus counsel argue 
that, because the FBI agent violated (or may have 
violated) certain laws, his conduct is so outrageous that it 
bars conviction. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 430. We 
conclude, however, that the agent’s conduct “is distinctly 
not of that breed.” Id. at 432. 
 First, Fattah and amicus counsel argue that a Fifth 
Amendment violation was predicated on a separate 
                                           
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 
182 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 
761 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Driscoll, 852 F.2d 
84, 86 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 
754, 762–63 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Ward, 793 
F.2d 551, 555 (3d Cir. 1986); Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 608–
09. 
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violation of the Sixth Amendment. But as we have 
already held, Fattah failed to establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation. 
 Second, amicus counsel argues that the agent 
violated Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure by disclosing Fattah’s identity as the target of 
a grand jury investigation. But the District Court found 
that Fattah failed to make a preliminary showing of such 
a violation, and Fattah does not challenge that finding on 
appeal.8 
 Third, amicus counsel argues that the officer may 
have committed obstruction of justice in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1503(a). But Fattah and amicus counsel fail to 
show an “evil intent to obstruct” the due administration 
of justice. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 
(1995). See generally United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 
155, 168 (3d Cir. 2013). On the limited record before us, 
we cannot prejudge the commission of this alleged 
                                           
 8 Even if that finding were challenged on appeal, 
we note a defendant must show prejudice to win 
dismissal of the indictment for a breach of grand jury 
secrecy; showing a simple violation of Rule 6(e) is 
insufficient. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 
U.S. 250, 255 (1988). But if defendants could simply 
reframe a violation of Rule 6(e) as a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, they could evade Nova Scotia’s prejudice 
requirement entirely. 
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offense.9 Such a determination is better left to the 
prosecutorial process following a full investigation. 
 Fourth, amicus counsel argues that the agent may 
have violated FBI policy. But the violation of internal 
policy alone does not amount to a violation of 
constitutional due process. See United States v. Christie, 
624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a claim of 
outrageous misconduct where the Government allegedly 
violated guidelines that “do not themselves create rights 
for criminal defendants”). 
 Finally, we are left with the arguments that the FBI 
agent disclosed certain confidential information 
contained in Fattah’s tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6103.10 According to Fattah’s opening brief, the 
                                           
 9 Amicus counsel relies on out-of-circuit dicta. See 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 
2006). Regardless, it is not settled that such a violation 
would entitle Fattah to relief. See United States v. 
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (1980) (“[T]he limitations 
of the Due Process Clause . . . come into play only when 
the Government activity in question violates some 
protected right of the defendant.” (quoting Hampton, 425 
U.S. at 490)). 
 10 Amicus counsel adds that the agent may have 
committed a misdemeanor under 18 U.S.C. § 1905, and 
also declares that the agent lied to the Magistrate Judge 
about the importance of confidentiality when he sought 
an order placing the search warrants under seal. These 
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Government conceded that violation in a parallel civil 
matter. But we are unable to conclude that the disclosure 
of this financial information, standing alone or in 
combination with any of the above considerations, is “so 
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely 
bar the government from invoking judicial processes to 
obtain a conviction.” Russell, 411 U.S. at 431–32. “[T]he 
remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable 
defendant, but in prosecuting the police” if such a 
violation occurred. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490; see 
Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 609; United States v. Walters, 16-
cr-338, slip op. at 18–19 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017). 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the FBI agent’s 
conduct did not violate Fattah’s Fifth or Sixth 
Amendment rights. That said, our opinion in this case 
should by no means “be construed as an approval of the 
government’s conduct.” Beverly, 723 F.2d at 13. To 
ensure the public trust, the Government bears a serious 
responsibility to investigate any malfeasance and take 
appropriate action. We hope that the FBI and 
prosecutorial authorities have done just that. 
III 
 We now turn to Fattah’s four remaining arguments 
that (A) various counts of the indictment fail to state an 
offense, (B) the Government constructively amended the 
                                                                                              
additional considerations do not alter our constitutional 
analysis. 
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indictment at trial, (C) the Superseding Indictment 
improperly joins unrelated charges, and (D) the 
Government’s search warrants were impermissibly 
broad. We reject each argument. 
A 
 First, Fattah argues that various counts in the 
indictment fail to state an offense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
7(c)(1). Reviewing de novo, we reject Fattah’s argument. 
 “[A]n indictment is facially sufficient if it (1) 
contains the elements of the offense intended to be 
charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of what 
he must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the 
defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he may 
plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a 
subsequent prosecution.” United States v. Stevenson, 832 
F.3d 412, 423 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. 
Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012)). We address the 
Counts in the same order as Fattah’s brief. 
 1.  Count 12 (Bank Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1344). Count 12 charged Fattah with misrepresenting to 
United Bank that he would use a line of credit for 
business expenses when he meant to use the money for 
personal expenses. Fattah argues that Count 12 merely 
charged breach of contract, not a criminal offense. 
According to Fattah, the conduct charged in the 
Superseding Indictment is consistent with making 
truthful representations at the time he applied for the loan 
but later failing to use the funds as promised. 
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 But Count 12 properly charged that Fattah 
employed “false and fraudulent pretenses, representations 
or promises” in order “to obtain” a loan. Supp. App. 18; 
18 U.S.C. § 1344. In other words, the Superseding 
Indictment plainly charged Fattah with making 
representations that he knew to be false or fraudulent at 
the time he made them. It then supported that allegation 
with specific facts about Fattah’s representations, his 
subsequent conduct, and the timing in between. 
 Fattah relies on several inapposite cases that 
address a defendant’s failure to disclose information to a 
bank. For example, in United States v. Steffen, 687 F.3d 
1104, 1116 (8th Cir. 2012), the Eighth Circuit held that a 
charge of bank fraud alleged mere breach of contract 
where, after obtaining approval for a loan, the defendant 
sold collateral without notifying the bank as required by 
the loan agreement. The Eighth Circuit concluded that 
the indictment failed to state an offense, in part, because 
the “breach of the security agreement was not 
accompanied or preceded by express 
misrepresentations.” Id. 
 Here, by contrast, the Superseding Indictment 
properly charged that Fattah made express 
misrepresentations “to obtain” the loan. Supp. App. 18. 
Whether Fattah’s statements were knowing 
misrepresentations (as opposed to sincere, unfulfilled 
promises) was a question of fact for the jury. The jury, 
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properly instructed, found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Fattah made knowing misrepresentations.11 
                                           
 11 Fattah argues that the Government failed to 
prove intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979), we reject this argument because the Government 
introduced ample circumstantial evidence of intent. For 
example, within two days of receiving approval for the 
loan, Fattah withdrew substantial funds from United 
Bank, deposited the funds in his personal checking 
account, and then began using the funds for personal 
expenses such as paying down gambling debts. The close 
timing of events, combined with Fattah moving the funds 
in an apparent effort to prevent United Bank from 
learning the funds’ true uses, permit an inference that 
Fattah never intended to use the loan as promised. That 
conclusion is further supported by Fattah’s own 
statements, which demonstrate a cavalier disregard for 
the funds’ appropriate uses. See, e.g., Supp. App. 82 
(“F*** the credit lines; it’s not about credit lines it’s 
about figuring out how to make money and having fun 
. . . .”); Supp. App. 188 (United Bank lending officer 
testifying that Fattah stated “something to the effect of 
that it’s his business, his company that he’s entitled to 
utilize the funds as he determined”). Thus, based on the 
evidence presented, a “rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 
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 2. Counts 20–23 (Wire Fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1343). The wire fraud Counts charge Fattah 
with requesting excess funds for DVHS’s budgets and 
pocketing the surplus. Fattah repeats his breach-of-
contract argument that the Superseding Indictment 
merely charged that he failed to perform all of the 
services identified in the budgets, not that he lied to 
obtain those funds. We reject this argument for the 
reasons provided above.12 
 3. Count 19 (Theft from a Program Receiving 
Federal Funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)). 
This Count alleged that Fattah’s scheme to manipulate 
DVHS’s budgets defrauded the PSD, an organization that 
received more than $10,000 in federal assistance. Supp. 
App. 29. Fattah relies on United States v. Copeland, 143 
F.3d 1439, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998), and other similar cases 
for the proposition that a company does not receive 
“Federal assistance,” 18 U.S.C. § 666(b), if it is “engaged 
in purely commercial transactions with the federal 
                                           
 12 On Counts 20–23, Fattah’s argument based on 
sufficiency of the evidence likewise fails. The 
Government introduced sufficient circumstantial 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude 
that Fattah knew the budgets were false at the time he 
submitted them. The evidence included Fattah’s own 
tape-recorded statements, records from his computers, 
wire transactions from DVHS to 259 Strategies, and 
statements from DVHS employees questioning the 
veracity of the budgets. 
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government,” Copeland, 143 F.3d at 1441. On that basis, 
Fattah argues that DVHS’s contractual relationship with 
the PSD was “purely commercial” and therefore outside 
the scope of § 666. But DVHS’s contract with the PSD is 
irrelevant. The applicability of § 666 turns on the PSD’s 
relationship with the federal government, not on its 
relationship with DVHS. Fattah does not dispute that the 
PSD received sufficient federal assistance to place it 
within the ambit of § 666(b). Therefore, defrauding the 
PSD amounted to a violation of § 666(a)(1)(A). 
 4. Counts 1–7 (False Statements to Obtain Bank 
Loans in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014). Counts 1–4 
charge Fattah with making false statements to four 
different banks in order to obtain loans. Fattah reiterates 
his breach-of-contract argument, which we reject for the 
reasons provided above. Counts 5–7 charge that Fattah 
aided and abetted false statements by his friend, Matthew 
Amato. According to Fattah, the indictment charges him 
with merely knowing Amato would lie to the bank, 
which is not a crime. But the Counts properly alleged that 
Fattah “knowingly induced and procured” Amato to 
commit the offenses. Supp. App. 9–11. 
 Fattah also raises an argument specific to Count 1. 
Count 1 alleges that Fattah used a false tax return to 
misrepresent financial information about 259 Strategies 
to a bank. Fattah argues that this is improper because the 
Government did not separately charge him with filing a 
false tax return for that year; such a charge would be 
time-barred. But a false tax return plainly constitutes a 
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“false statement or report.” 18 U.S.C. § 1014; see United 
States v. Nash, 115 F.3d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(“[T]he 1985 and 1986 false tax returns were separate 
documents that could independently support separate 
counts under section 1014.”). The fact that the statute of 
limitations lapsed on a separate tax offense does not, as 
Fattah argues, render the return “true and correct,” Fattah 
Br. 33, for purposes of the charged offense. Cf. United 
States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(holding that the federal statute of limitations governs 
RICO charges even if the predicate offenses were time-
barred); United States v. Guerrero, 882 F. Supp. 2d 463, 
495 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that charges for drug-
related murders “are not subject to a statute of 
limitations, regardless of whether the underlying 
narcotics conspiracy, if charged separately, would be 
time-barred” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 560 F. App’x 110 
(2d Cir. 2014). 
 5. Count 8 (False Statements Concerning a Loan 
Insured by the Small Business Administration in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1001). The indictment charged that Fattah 
told a bank that he had an “inability to earn substantial 
income.” Supp. App. 12. Though Fattah calls this a 
“statement of opinion,” Fattah Br. 34, whether that 
statement was a knowing misrepresentation was likewise 
a question of fact for the jury. Nor was that statement the 
only misrepresentation charged; the indictment also 
charged Fattah with misrepresenting the dollar figure of 
his income and the operational status of 259 Strategies. 
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 Fattah also argues that his statement was protected 
by the First Amendment, but it is well established that 
“the First Amendment does not shield fraud.” Illinois, ex 
rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 
600, 612 (2003). 
 6. Count 11 (False Statements to Settle a Bank 
Loan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014). Count 11 charges 
Fattah with lying in a civil deposition in an effort to 
evade repaying one of his creditors. Fattah argues that the 
statute does not cover lying in depositions because, 
otherwise, “no individual would ever sit for a civil 
deposition in state court without invoking their rights to 
remain silent.” Fattah Br. 34. 
 A false statement taken in a deposition is no less a 
“false statement or report.” 18 U.S.C. § 1014; see United 
States v. Todosijevic, 161 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 1998). 
Nor is it particularly unusual that a statement made in 
civil litigation could have criminal consequences. That is 
precisely why litigants in civil matters are permitted to 
invoke their Fifth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Lefkowitz 
v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (“[S]ince the 
test is whether the testimony might later subject the 
witness to criminal prosecution, the privilege is available 
to a witness in a civil proceeding . . . .”). 
 7. Count 13 (False Statements to Obtain a Bank 
Loan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014). This Count 
charges Fattah with failing to disclose to a bank, inter 
alia, his other sources of indebtedness. Fattah argues that 
the loan application did not ask for that information. But 
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the loan application did ask for that information, which 
Fattah omitted. Supp. App. 434. Fattah insists that he was 
not obligated to disclose that information because his 
only outstanding loans were in his sham business’s name, 
not his own. Even accepting that distinction arguendo, 
that argument goes to the sufficiency of the evidence, not 
a failure to state an offense. As the Count offers an 
alternative theory of conviction (lies about monthly rent 
and car payments), we will “assume that the jury 
convicted on the factually sufficient theory.” United 
States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the Superseding 
Indictment stated offenses on all Counts. 
B 
Fattah next argues that the Government 
constructively amended the Superseding Indictment by 
introducing certain evidence or making certain arguments 
that “do not appear in the indictment.” Fattah Br. 35. We 
conclude that the Superseding Indictment was not 
constructively amended. 
An indictment is constructively amended when 
“the evidence and jury instructions at trial modify 
essential terms of the charged offense” such that “there is 
a substantial likelihood that the jury may have convicted 
the defendant for an offense differing from the offense 
. . . actually charged.” United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 
230, 257–58 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. 
Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259–60 (3d Cir. 2006)). “If a 
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defendant is convicted of the same offense that was 
charged in the indictment, there is no constructive 
amendment.” United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 
532 (3d Cir. 2010). 
First, Fattah identifies certain factual allegations 
that were not specifically enumerated in the Superseding 
Indictment. For example, the prosecutor said in his 
opening statement that Fattah “told Sun Bank that 259 
Strategies had one employee. He told Bank of America 
they had three employees.” Fattah Br. 35. While the 
Superseding Indictment does not specifically allege that 
Fattah misrepresented the number of employees at 259 
Strategies, at most this constitutes a “variance” from the 
facts alleged. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 532. Such a variance 
constitutes reversible error “only if it is likely to have 
surprised or has otherwise prejudiced the defense.” Id. 
(quoting Daraio, 445 F.3d at 262). Here, there is no risk 
of surprise because the indictment identified a non-
exhaustive list of statements on a single loan 
application—statements that would be well known to 
their author, Fattah. 
Second, Fattah identifies arguments and evidence 
that he claims to be irrelevant or prejudicial. For 
example, Fattah complains that the Government 
introduced evidence “intended to inflame the jury” by, 
inter alia, highlighting his $15,000 bill at the Capital 
Grille restaurant (Br. 36, 40), highlighting his gambling 
losses of $125,280 (Br. 37), referring to Fattah as a “son 
of privilege” and as “Congressman Fattah’s son” (Br. 
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38), referencing Fattah’s condominium at the Ritz 
Carlton (Br. 40, 43), and calling Fattah an “unqualified 
[college] dropout” (Br. 41). Fattah also argued that the 
Government adduced evidence irrelevant to the crime 
charged. For example, he asserts that any evidence about 
how he used the lines of credit is irrelevant because the 
crime was completed at the time Fattah made the 
misrepresentation (Br. 35–36, 38, 44). But these 
objections to relevance and prejudice are quintessentially 
evidentiary arguments governed by Rules 401, 402, and 
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The time to object 
to and appeal the admissibility of that evidence has 
passed. Far from constructively amending the 
Superseding Indictment, the evidence at issue (and the 
Government’s fair commentary on that evidence) provide 
circumstantial illustration of Fattah’s motive, 
opportunity, intent, and knowledge regarding the crimes 
charged. 
And third, Fattah argues that the Government 
amended the Superseding Indictment by introducing 
evidence of uncharged crimes. For example, the 
Government introduced evidence that Fattah stole money 
from clients of his sham concierge service, American 
Royalty. That theft was not charged in the Superseding 
Indictment; instead, the evidence was offered to show the 
existence of income that Fattah failed to report on his tax 
return and to his creditors. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 
Again, this did not change the theory of the prosecution 
or modify essential terms of a charged offense. As we 
have held, introducing evidence of other crimes does not 
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constructively amend the indictment when the jury is 
properly instructed. See Daraio, 445 F.3d at 260 
(“Although we agree with Daraio that the government 
presented a significant amount of evidence concerning 
her prior tax non-compliance beyond that charged in the 
indictment, the district court’s instructions ensured that 
the jury would convict her, if at all, for a crime based on 
conduct charged in the indictment.”). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Superseding 
Indictment was not constructively amended. 
C 
 Next, Fattah argues that the indictment improperly 
joins three distinct categories of crime: bank fraud, tax 
fraud, and fraud on the Philadelphia School District. We 
reject this argument as well. 
 Under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, an indictment may include multiple counts 
that “are of the same or similar character, or are based on 
the same act or transaction, or are connected with or 
constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 8(a). “If the reviewing court determines that 
counts have been improperly joined, it must then apply a 
harmless error analysis, reversing the trial court if the 
misjoinder resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant.” 
United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 241 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
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 Reviewing de novo, we conclude that the charges 
were properly joined for three reasons. First, the offenses 
were of a “similar character.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). Each 
involved a series of false representations about business 
entities owned or represented by Fattah. Those 
misrepresentations were calculated to either steal or 
avoid paying certain funds. Second, the charged offenses 
were interrelated “parts of a common scheme or plan.” 
Id. For example, Fattah would use false tax information 
to convince banks to offer him loans. Similarly, both the 
fraud on the PSD and the bank fraud had the effect of 
transferring ill-gotten gains to 259 Strategies, which 
Fattah used as his personal bank account. Thus, the 
different offenses represent different components of a 
single “enrichment scheme,” and “[j]oinder under this 
rationale is acceptable.” McGill, 964 F.2d at 241. And 
third, this circuit does not have a per se prohibition on 
joining tax and non-tax charges. See id. (“Joinder of tax 
and non-tax claims is not unusual.”). 
 Nor was Fattah prejudiced. Fattah has not 
explained how the joinder of these counts impaired the 
fairness of his trial, nor has he argued that the jury would 
be unable to “compartmentalize the evidence.” United 
States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citation omitted). The District Court instructed the jury 
that “[e]ach count and the evidence pertaining to it must 
be considered separately,” Supp. App. 254, and “juries 
are presumed to follow their instructions,” Richardson v. 
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). 
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 We therefore conclude that the joinder of counts 
was not improper. 
D 
 Finally, Fattah argues that the search warrants 
executed at his home and office were overly broad. 
Specifically, he asserts that the search warrants were not 
particularized because they permitted the Government to 
seize business records spanning time periods not covered 
by the indictment. Reviewing de novo, we reject this 
argument. 
 Under the Fourth Amendment, “a warrant may not 
be issued unless . . . the scope of the authorized search is 
set out with particularity.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 
452, 459 (2011). But the particularity requirement “must 
be applied with a practical margin of flexibility.” United 
States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986). 
“This flexibility is especially appropriate in cases 
involving complex schemes spanning many years that 
can be uncovered only by exacting scrutiny of intricate 
financial records.” United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 
749, 760 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 In this case, the warrant authorized the seizure of a 
number of document types, including “[a]ll financial 
records,” [a]ll checks paid to employees for wages,” 
“[a]ll tax records,” and other similar documents. Supp. 
App. 74–75. That level of particularity is consistent with 
what we approved in Christine: “all folders . . . all checks 
. . . all general ledgers (and) all correspondence . . . .” 
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687 F.2d at 753 (alterations in original). “By directing the 
searching officers to seize all of these items, the 
magistrate, rather than the officer, determined what was 
to be seized.” Id.  
 Thus, based on the complex nature of the crime 
charged and appropriate direction provided by the 
Magistrate Judge, we conclude that the warrants satisfied 
the particularity requirement. 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
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